Policy studies in India: Finding direction and purpose

In recent years, there has been a steady increase in the number of think tanks and academic institutions studying public policy in India. These range from government funded bodies (like NITI Aayog), private sector organizations (like Observer Research Foundation or Centre for Policy Research) to international forums (like World Economic Forum, World Bank) and policy schools in premier higher education institutions (Centre for Policy Studies at IIT Bombay, School of Public Policy at IIT Delhi).

These indicate a divergence from the previous dominance of the Civil Service, mainly through the Planning Commission, in policy recommendation and analysis. While implementation was seen as the key determinant of policy success or failure till 1990s, this has given way to analysis of policy design, assumptions, forecasts and the very objective of the policy. This has also resulted in both a politicization of policy and the policy-fication of politics. In spite of the inchoate nature of the process, policy debates still provide the core of ideas, justifications and concepts – although more contentiously in a political environment where achievement of power through ideological hegemony seems to be the predominant goal. This articles discusses the direction of policy studies and its changing relevance in current political context.

While Planning Commission in India signified policy as a technocratic tool of an enlightened administration, recent developments have taken an argumentative turn locating policy both as a strategy servicing politicians and interest groups (politicization of policy) and as a tool to structure and systematize the public debate between experts, citizens and states (policy-fication of politics). The Commission in its latter decades was criticized for its lack of political realism and introducing political preferences under the guise of neutral procedures and technicalities in pursuit of political objectives.

Although similar critiques can be made of Niti Aayog, today’s broader policy debate recognizes human biases, political motivations and power dynamics much more than it did in the past. Diverse and emerging institutions of policy studies also reflect reduced relevance of traditional political scientists in the power hierarchy of policy process. This is signified by shift to a more technocratic approach that studies impact, processes and content of public policy based on causation, falsification and evidence. This seems to be a more causal approach that diagnoses problems, conducts trials/experiments and predicts impacts of policy interventions. To what end, is an open question. They may be just as political in the guise of neutral.

Moreover, there is an added appreciation of action imperatives and political demands that policymakers face, although sometimes it may be used to justify very bad but enthusiastic policies. Policy studies today lie at the intersection of scientific rationality as a means of solving collective problems and the socio-cultural fragmentations that regard rationality as exclusionary, undemocratic and incompatible with diversity, and hence fallible. To ameliorate this, policy reports try to underline improvements and modification as important components of policy, thus locating it in an iterative social context of public understanding, dialogue and action.

At the same time, opening up of the policy process has also lead to multiple cosy relationships among politicians, administrators, analysts and commentators who have coherent views on an issue. This generates pockets of influence with divergent political framing systems, whose relevance changes with power dynamics. In fact, this is a clear example of politicization of policy where any evidence is no more than an argument to further an outcome.

In this context, policy studies may be seen just as a systematic means to provide clever strategic shortcuts and simplifications to decision-makers with only modest changes in their knowledge, i.e. policy analysts are seen as just providing ammunition in a rhetorical contest whose policy outcome has been decided by those in power. Optimistically, this can also be viewed as a way for to forge common ground between competing interests. However, this may also create a moral relativism where reprehensible policies suddenly emerge as solutions from the supposed consensus of participatory or electoral politics.  It disregards the conditions for such a political consensus, if it can be so called, resulting in political deception and manipulated legitimation of forced consent.

One of the issues with this argumentative turn in policy studies is the creation of counter-experts immune to learning or reflection – ‘tribes of experts’ – who create ‘contradictory certainties’ beyond comparison for politically persuasive audiences, which reinforces polarization and leads to policy paralysis. Policy studies today is caught between the practical demands of scientific analysis and the increasingly tenuous practice of politics. It is in a dilemma between serving either an active participatory, national citizenship, or a self-proclaimed, enlightened, policy-making political élite (includes opposition) which is global.

This predicament also signifies a gradual decoupling of policy studies from its previous role in supporting government-initiatives, towards shaping debate on issues that have either skipped decision makers or which require more global agreements to emerge before a policy problem is even defined. While policy studies is an emerging field in Indian academia, it would be wise for its promoters and practitioners to recognize the direction they are treading on and reflect on the way forward. The fractured nature of modern politics can easily seep into policy studies, undermining the expertise of policy analysts and degrading the quality of policy-making.

References:

Hoppe, R., “Policy analysis, science and politics: from ‘speaking truth to power’ to ‘making sense together’, Science and Public Policy, 26-3 (1999)

Regulation of networked industries: Questions from a monopoly perspective

With increase in the prevalence and pervasiveness of networked industries in our lives, there is an increasingly involved debate on regulation of big technological companies. Both from the economic left and the right, there are voices that raise alarm about the size and scope that the firms in these industries are attaining. While some have suggested breaking up of these companies into smaller ones, others have advocated for wise regulation.

Despite the muddled nature of this debate, this much is clear: The concern for market structure, which had given way to focus on prices as the object of regulation, is back. Tendencies of monopolization are no longer being assumed to be benign or natural as had been the case for the past few decades.

The network effects, the economies of scale and scope as well as the reduction of redundancies that monopolization can bring into a networked industry, does not discount the fact that it bestows an unparalleled power to the owners of the network. The question then becomes how do we think about this power and what to do about it.

In this context, here are a few questions that may be relevant:

  1. If monopoly isn’t illegal, how does one decide if it is “natural”?
  2. What are the supply side (cost) characteristics of the market that can be used to justify a natural monopoly? How is such a legal monopoly to be regulated?
  3. What are the demand side properties that justify the tendency of a firm to monopolize an industry?
  4. If monopolization is an acceptable tendency in an industry, how far can we allow the market power to grow? Is the regulation then to be focused on Price? Service quality? Distribution? Efficiency? Social welfare?
  5. What if regulation is more costly than monopolization?
  6. How do we respond to competitive pressures generated by technological change on monopolies?
  7. How do we evaluate the desirability to introduce competition in an already monopoly market?
  8. In terms of regulation, is there a possibility of better information exchange between regulator and the regulated so as to make decisions efficient?
  9. What are the assumptions that get built into the economy with introduction of competition or with changed regulation? How does that change?
  10. If there is only a partial introduction of competition into auxiliary business opportunities of incumbent monopolies, doesn’t that still leave the new entrants in these fields vulnerable to the willingness of the incumbent to share access?
  11. Even so, what are the terms and conditions of this access?

References:

Joskow, P., Regulation of natural monopolies, Handbook of Law and Economics (2007)