Pakistan is not what I want India to become – that or a version of it has become a common refrain among liberal Pakistanis, especially those living in the West. They see the current Indian political landscape, both party politics and social changes, and find a resonance with the majoritarian religiosity that entered Pakistani politics long back. While this concern may or may not play out similarly in India, it does give a starting point to examine the changes among Hindus, especially as it relates to Muslims and also to Pakistan.

Today, the orthodox, right-wing Hindus see Muslims as an aberration to their vision of India. In their rhetoric, Muslims should go to Pakistan. But was this always the case? Did Indian Hindus’ views about Pakistan always map clearly onto their views about Indian Muslims? If not, then how did policies towards Muslims have increasingly come to be proxies for how you feel towards Pakistan, or vice versa?

After independence, there was Partition and then wars with Pakistan over Kashmir. Although social acceptance of Indian Muslims was contentious and religious violence wasn’t rare, government policies towards Pakistan had very little bearing on Muslims in India, at least not from the perspective of the state. The ruling politicians in the early independence period were careful not to question the loyalty of Indian Muslims. In fact, their patriotism and loyalty was either presumed or left unquestioned.

In this respect, there were three kinds of Hindus in India. First, the orthodox liberals who were devoted to Hindu religious practices, who saw Indian Muslims and Pakistan differently. For them, domestic support for Muslims was not antithetical to a hawkish Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan – they distinguished it against their liberal domestic worldview. Secondly, there were the secular liberals who were not devoted to Hindu religious practices and saw Indian Muslims and Pakistan similarly, as manifestations of their secular liberalism. For them, hawkish foreign policy towards Pakistan was not good for peace. These two broadly formed the ruling elite. On the other side, there were orthodox conservatives who were deeply religious and saw Indian Muslims and Pakistan similarly. For them, loyalty of Indian Muslims was always questionable and they projected their anti-Pakistan views onto Indian Muslims. They always had resonance with the Hindu masses but seldom attained political power.

The secular liberals were very few in number initially. But this has changed over the years. The children and grand-children of the Independence and Partition times have very different political, religious and social views. So, the demography of Hindus has changed as well. More persons in this new generation have become secular liberals, who are much less likely to switch from their domestic liberal worldview to a more hawkish policy towards Pakistan. Their narrative of human rights and equality means that they condemn violence perpetuated by Hindus just as much as they condemn violence perpetuated by Muslims. They are more likely to have Muslim friends, read literature by Muslim authors, understand the exclusion and violence faced by Indian Muslims, be familiar with the dynamics of Pakistani society, maybe even have Pakistani friends or acquaintances. Their number have grown considerably since the 1960s.

At the same time, the orthodox conservatives have increased their political and social influence in India. The previously diffuse tensions between Hindus and Muslims have now become common and organised. The modern orthodox conservatives are more liberal within their own religious tribe, where their cosmopolitanism ends and regressive, religious paranoia and hawkishness begins. They see no distinction between majoritarian nationalism and constitutional democracy. They see no distinction between Indian Muslims and Pakistan. They have also become steeped in the political and legal institutions in ways that they can use those structures to act act on their paranoia about Indian Muslims. Their number, and more importantly, power have grown enormously.

The older orthodox Hindu liberals seem to have become less vocal and less powerful, at least politically. They are increasingly being forced to either go along with the modern orthodox conservatives on the right or with the secular liberals on the left. This polarization of Indian Hindus also reflects another deeper change. The recent rise of Hindu orthodoxy has created a divide in Indian Hindus, with two different demographics with divergent life experiences.

The new generation is far away from the actual experience of Partition, unless they have relatives who lived through it. This is partly because of the our history education in schools which is simplistic and misleading. Even on the left, it is more ideological liberalism than actual historical knowledge that seeks to promote peace. In this complicated dynamic enters imagination. As the generation that lived through Partition dies with their complex stories, ideologically convenient narrative are staking claims to history. One is that of secular India and another is that of Hindu India – the first fails to appreciate the inherent religious tensions of Indian society and the second wants to overcome it by religious singularity. The vibrant discussions, conflicts and disagreements between the leaders of the Independence movement – Nehru, Gandhi, Patel, Ambedkar, Bhagat Singh, Bose etc. have been brushed aside for ideological reasons in our education system – both old and the emerging one. This means that large populations of Hindus are unfamiliar with the experience of Muslims. They are ignorant, utterly prepared to connect or communicate with Muslims who are their fellow citizens.

This is also manifest in a common theme among secular liberals and orthodox conservatives – they do not want to or hope not to see Hindus and Muslims, or Indian and Pakistan as distinct. For liberals, religion itself is problematic and Pakistan has just as harsh problems as India, although of different magnitudes. They feel ashamed when Indian government or people violate their values of equality and non-discrimination. They protest Hindutva nationalism, feel alienated by what India has done to its Muslims. For conservatives, Pakistan and Indian Muslims are an aberration of the ancient Hindu civilization and they seek to correct it, first by taming and then by converting it – both Pakistan and Indian Muslims.

In terms of electoral politics, there are few Pakistani politicians that Indian liberals can identify with and few Indian politicians that Pakistani liberals can identify with. The conservatives on both side do not seek to identify with the other at all. In this mix, the very idea of democracy in India is being questioned, juxtaposing it with the narrative of Hindu civilization and with Pakistan already as a Islamic republic, post-Partition. We are moving towards a tipping point.

The 2019 campaign already shows that the right can exploit the gap between the liberal, Congress elite and a mass base that invested in the imaginary equivalence of Indian Muslims and Pakistan. Some politicians have even suggested Indian Muslims to prove their loyalty regularly in order to demand their constitutional rights, conditioning the already problematic notion of Muslim empowerment. At the same time, developments in Pakistan with its expanding ‘Mullah-Military’ alliance further reinforce the polarization – liberals equate it with increasing religious fundamentalism of Indian state while for conservatives, it is just another tick in their long list of wrongs. In fact, the latter suggest lack of democracy in Pakistan to prompt hawkishness, and to make Indian Muslims feel grateful about their representation.

While the earlier orthodox liberals in power did not impose their lens of India on Pakistan, the modern liberals and conservatives, striving for power, both openly impose their view of India on Pakistan – with consequences for Indian Muslims. The questions of dual loyalty has also begun to be posed to secular liberals who are portrayed as neither Hindu not sufficiently nationalistic, putting them in the same box as Indian Muslims whose affiliations have already been deemed questionable. Hatred of Pakistan and of Indian Muslims has been sought to be made the sine qua non of Indian identity. The conversations now are not about Muslims and Pakistan but also away from the history of Partition to the Mughal Empire itself as an aberration in the Hindu Civilization. The question being posed is: ‘Does Pakistan has a right to exist?’ which is also a proxy for ‘Do Muslims have a right to exist?’

A lot of this narrative also seeks to devoid the Muslims of any agency – they are seen either as victims or terrorists. That is just as problematic. It ignores the internal conflicts and disagreements among Muslims in India, who are not a monolith. The Hindutva narrative also forces these internal critics to prove their loyalty to Islam, let they become un-Islamic. So, when the very existence of Indian Muslims is questioned, what do liberal Indian Muslims do?

The complex debate we need to have is not possible when secularism and pluralism is dismissed as foreign ideas just easily as all religious values are cast aside as regressive. There has to be a tough questioning of both. Otherwise, we will keep pushing each other way.