Tag Archives: ideology

From Ideological Pragmatism to Hindutva : A Hypothesis of 2019 Elections

Posted on by
Reply

Pragmatism as a governing ‘logic’ post 1970s

Elections till 2014 including the ones that Congress lost, were fought on atleast the rhetoric of Nehruvian ideas of liberal democracy, progressive social reform and economic development. Simultaneously, since the Emergency, India has seen ‘pragmatism’, both in economic and social policy, as a governing ‘logic’ used by successive governments to push a patchwork of reforms – a multitude of temporary props to assuage public protests, mitigate crises and stabilize a crumbling system – with rather myopic policy frameworks while leaving myriad discordant conflicts for the future.

Neither Congress nor non-Congress regimes explicitly claimed to any ideological political framework in this period – an ambiguity which suited them in electoral strategy and post-election alliances. While pragmatism gave more room for maneuver, both to Congress and non-Congress governments, it lacked a coherent ideology to combat a new opponent which it has found in the form of Hindutva. In political terms, pragmatism is not an ideology and it can never counter any ideology while it may be a condition for maintaining it.

Hindutva as the governing ethic post 2014

That ideological ambiguity has summarily changed with the 2019 elections, but it didn’t happen abruptly. The governing political ideology of India started undergoing a change starting in the 1970s with the conflicts surrounding the Emergency, Mandal Commission and Babri Masjid demolition. 2019 elections mark a completion of that change. The last five years were, in a way, a launch pad to a new ideological formation – Hindutva – as the governing ethic by the BJP. In many ways, the ideological assertion of Hindutva in India’s political system is testimony to the catastrophically flawed nature of post-Nehruvian pragmatism that was ideologically hollow by design.

While it does not have much to differentiate itself from the Congress in terms of the economy, BJP has shown that there is much more outside the economy that it can make people care about. In a way, its 2014 campaign was very much in the vein of ‘pragmatism’ of preceding elections – promise of jobs, low inflation, and no corruption – while Hindutva remained in the background. The ideological divide between the Congress and BJP wasn’t as big a factor then as it was in 2019. The recently concluded elections were not fought on the old – who is more pragmatic – terms. There was a clear ideological divide and BJP did not shy away from underlining it.

What the last five years show is, if the framing of pragmatism is devoid of ideological underpinnings, intentionally or otherwise, it becomes vulnerable to criticism, even subjugation, from another doctrine ready to take the space. The 2019 elections were the first to have been fought on a wholly and radically different ideological plank of Hindutva, with explicit condemnation of Nehruvian liberal democracy.

All the Congress had to offer in response was its own version of Hindutva, justified in the language of ideological pragmatism – it didn’t even try to been seen defending the Nehruvian ideology, content in claiming ownership to Nehru’s legacy. That does not mean that the ideology of Nehruvian liberalism had all answers to India’s problems, just that its policy prescriptions was grounded in solid ideological framework.

Political necessity of opposition’s ideological framework

Being the propagator of the governing ideology, BJP could only commit “errors” – it could never be fundamentally wrong in the way its ideologically shaky opponents could. Moreover, in politics, the point is not to avoid all the errors but to be able to justify it – this needs an ideology. BJP could justify anything within its ideological doctrine – from demonetization to mob lynchings. Congress and the opposition needs to realize that the new common sense about social and political norms have changed, heavily influenced by the ideological preferences of the BJP. The Indian National Congress has to atleast attempt to provide a new common sense.

Frankly speaking, the opposition never tried to decisively dislodge the emerging hegemonic force of Hindutva – they only tried to get around it. What the opposition offered was not a counter-ideology but a pragmatic bend of the prevailing Hindutva doctrine in a less fundamental direction. Calls for pragmatism cannot stand without an accompanying doctrine. Without an ideological framework, a pragmatism can always be framed as ideologically bankrupt. BJP did just that, on every occasion it could. Opposition’s pleas to the pragmatism of Indian voters had no robust ideological underpinning. Successful as it might have been in previous elections, it was seen as an incoherent and defensive response.

If Congress wants to stop Hindutva from achieving hegemony, it has to now fulfill the political necessity of an alternative ideological doctrine in response to BJP’s own ideological assertions. Without an ideological force behind the opposition, Hindutva will become the default governing doctrine of Indian politics. Any subsequent pragmatism thereafter will be forced to abstract from that new common sense, just like pre-2014 pragmatism abstracted from the default of Nehruvian liberalism.

Conclusion

For the opposition to offer anything substantial as a challenge, it has to develop a robust new common sense, based not on pragmatic interpretation of the prevailing views of Hindutva but on ideological coherence of its counter-narrative and exemplar governance where it presently holds power. The unchallenged political sway that the Hindutva doctrine has acquired over Indian politics will gradually seep into constitutional institutions, civil society, academic and research institutions etc. The challenge therefore is to answer the political necessity of a cogent ideology which can provide foundations for pragmatic governance.

Indian Muslims, polarized Hindus and Pakistan

Posted on by
Reply

Pakistan is not what I want India to become – that or a version of it has become a common refrain among liberal Pakistanis, especially those living in the West. They see the current Indian political landscape, both party politics and social changes, and find a resonance with the majoritarian religiosity that entered Pakistani politics long back. While this concern may or may not play out similarly in India, it does give a starting point to examine the changes among Hindus, especially as it relates to Muslims and also to Pakistan.

Today, the orthodox, right-wing Hindus see Muslims as an aberration to their vision of India. In their rhetoric, Muslims should go to Pakistan. But was this always the case? Did Indian Hindus’ views about Pakistan always map clearly onto their views about Indian Muslims? If not, then how did policies towards Muslims have increasingly come to be proxies for how you feel towards Pakistan, or vice versa?

After independence, there was Partition and then wars with Pakistan over Kashmir. Although social acceptance of Indian Muslims was contentious and religious violence wasn’t rare, government policies towards Pakistan had very little bearing on Muslims in India, at least not from the perspective of the state. The ruling politicians in the early independence period were careful not to question the loyalty of Indian Muslims. In fact, their patriotism and loyalty was either presumed or left unquestioned.

In this respect, there were three kinds of Hindus in India. First, the orthodox liberals who were devoted to Hindu religious practices, who saw Indian Muslims and Pakistan differently. For them, domestic support for Muslims was not antithetical to a hawkish Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan – they distinguished it against their liberal domestic worldview. Secondly, there were the secular liberals who were not devoted to Hindu religious practices and saw Indian Muslims and Pakistan similarly, as manifestations of their secular liberalism. For them, hawkish foreign policy towards Pakistan was not good for peace. These two broadly formed the ruling elite. On the other side, there were orthodox conservatives who were deeply religious and saw Indian Muslims and Pakistan similarly. For them, loyalty of Indian Muslims was always questionable and they projected their anti-Pakistan views onto Indian Muslims. They always had resonance with the Hindu masses but seldom attained political power.

The secular liberals were very few in number initially. But this has changed over the years. The children and grand-children of the Independence and Partition times have very different political, religious and social views. So, the demography of Hindus has changed as well. More persons in this new generation have become secular liberals, who are much less likely to switch from their domestic liberal worldview to a more hawkish policy towards Pakistan. Their narrative of human rights and equality means that they condemn violence perpetuated by Hindus just as much as they condemn violence perpetuated by Muslims. They are more likely to have Muslim friends, read literature by Muslim authors, understand the exclusion and violence faced by Indian Muslims, be familiar with the dynamics of Pakistani society, maybe even have Pakistani friends or acquaintances. Their number have grown considerably since the 1960s.

At the same time, the orthodox conservatives have increased their political and social influence in India. The previously diffuse tensions between Hindus and Muslims have now become common and organised. The modern orthodox conservatives are more liberal within their own religious tribe, where their cosmopolitanism ends and regressive, religious paranoia and hawkishness begins. They see no distinction between majoritarian nationalism and constitutional democracy. They see no distinction between Indian Muslims and Pakistan. They have also become steeped in the political and legal institutions in ways that they can use those structures to act act on their paranoia about Indian Muslims. Their number, and more importantly, power have grown enormously.

The older orthodox Hindu liberals seem to have become less vocal and less powerful, at least politically. They are increasingly being forced to either go along with the modern orthodox conservatives on the right or with the secular liberals on the left. This polarization of Indian Hindus also reflects another deeper change. The recent rise of Hindu orthodoxy has created a divide in Indian Hindus, with two different demographics with divergent life experiences.

The new generation is far away from the actual experience of Partition, unless they have relatives who lived through it. This is partly because of the our history education in schools which is simplistic and misleading. Even on the left, it is more ideological liberalism than actual historical knowledge that seeks to promote peace. In this complicated dynamic enters imagination. As the generation that lived through Partition dies with their complex stories, ideologically convenient narrative are staking claims to history. One is that of secular India and another is that of Hindu India – the first fails to appreciate the inherent religious tensions of Indian society and the second wants to overcome it by religious singularity. The vibrant discussions, conflicts and disagreements between the leaders of the Independence movement – Nehru, Gandhi, Patel, Ambedkar, Bhagat Singh, Bose etc. have been brushed aside for ideological reasons in our education system – both old and the emerging one. This means that large populations of Hindus are unfamiliar with the experience of Muslims. They are ignorant, utterly prepared to connect or communicate with Muslims who are their fellow citizens.

This is also manifest in a common theme among secular liberals and orthodox conservatives – they do not want to or hope not to see Hindus and Muslims, or Indian and Pakistan as distinct. For liberals, religion itself is problematic and Pakistan has just as harsh problems as India, although of different magnitudes. They feel ashamed when Indian government or people violate their values of equality and non-discrimination. They protest Hindutva nationalism, feel alienated by what India has done to its Muslims. For conservatives, Pakistan and Indian Muslims are an aberration of the ancient Hindu civilization and they seek to correct it, first by taming and then by converting it – both Pakistan and Indian Muslims.

In terms of electoral politics, there are few Pakistani politicians that Indian liberals can identify with and few Indian politicians that Pakistani liberals can identify with. The conservatives on both side do not seek to identify with the other at all. In this mix, the very idea of democracy in India is being questioned, juxtaposing it with the narrative of Hindu civilization and with Pakistan already as a Islamic republic, post-Partition. We are moving towards a tipping point.

The 2019 campaign already shows that the right can exploit the gap between the liberal, Congress elite and a mass base that invested in the imaginary equivalence of Indian Muslims and Pakistan. Some politicians have even suggested Indian Muslims to prove their loyalty regularly in order to demand their constitutional rights, conditioning the already problematic notion of Muslim empowerment. At the same time, developments in Pakistan with its expanding ‘Mullah-Military’ alliance further reinforce the polarization – liberals equate it with increasing religious fundamentalism of Indian state while for conservatives, it is just another tick in their long list of wrongs. In fact, the latter suggest lack of democracy in Pakistan to prompt hawkishness, and to make Indian Muslims feel grateful about their representation.

While the earlier orthodox liberals in power did not impose their lens of India on Pakistan, the modern liberals and conservatives, striving for power, both openly impose their view of India on Pakistan – with consequences for Indian Muslims. The questions of dual loyalty has also begun to be posed to secular liberals who are portrayed as neither Hindu not sufficiently nationalistic, putting them in the same box as Indian Muslims whose affiliations have already been deemed questionable. Hatred of Pakistan and of Indian Muslims has been sought to be made the sine qua non of Indian identity. The conversations now are not about Muslims and Pakistan but also away from the history of Partition to the Mughal Empire itself as an aberration in the Hindu Civilization. The question being posed is: ‘Does Pakistan has a right to exist?’ which is also a proxy for ‘Do Muslims have a right to exist?’

A lot of this narrative also seeks to devoid the Muslims of any agency – they are seen either as victims or terrorists. That is just as problematic. It ignores the internal conflicts and disagreements among Muslims in India, who are not a monolith. The Hindutva narrative also forces these internal critics to prove their loyalty to Islam, let they become un-Islamic. So, when the very existence of Indian Muslims is questioned, what do liberal Indian Muslims do?

The complex debate we need to have is not possible when secularism and pluralism is dismissed as foreign ideas just easily as all religious values are cast aside as regressive. There has to be a tough questioning of both. Otherwise, we will keep pushing each other way.