Digital Economy, Society and Governance

I came across this interesting discussion in which governance of the digital economy is analyzed. I have tried to review and present my thoughts on this lecture by Prof. Rainer Kattel.

Rainer Kattel: Governing the digital economy | University College London (UCL) Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (IIPP)

Prof. Kattel begins with some facts about the digital economy and its effects on privacy, productivity, employment, market concentration and global trade. He only uses these as a plane to discuss some more fundamental changes in our society brought about by digital technologies and its version of capitalism.

Features of the digital economy:

  • Not just automate but informate: Citing Zuboff, the lecture notes that today’s technologies learns not just about processes but also about users, their abilities and deficiencies such that it improve itself – a fundamental shift from earlier machines which performed routine, automated tasks. This presents questions for management of firms and organization behavior. Although this is a transformation, Zuboff’s work also notes the imperatives of what she calls ‘surveillance’ capitalism are different from managerial capitalism that the lecture focuses on.
  • Collective production of innovation: Citing Benkler, the lecture notes that production has always been a social process and in the digital age, this is more so as people willing give information into networks that becomes channels of innovation. For example, Open Source Software like Linux which has been amended and improved by myriad developers without profit motive. The question is, why have organized firms if innovation can be peer-produced? This process, according to Benkler, is varied in terms of granularity and modularity such that peer-production happens according to convenience and expertise of the developers.
  • Intangible Capital: Citing Haskel and Westlake, the lecture notes the increases relevance of brands, teamwork, social networks of employees, ability to source ideas from outside the firm etc. present challenges of measuring value of people as well as products and processes.

Digital Innovation and Competition

While classical economics argues for perfect competition, innovation happens via imperfect competition, as Schumpeter had proposed. The rapid expansion of market share which happens if technology itself learning to do things it is designed to do, can only be viewed as imperfect competition. This leads to reinvention of capitalism as technology changes every few decades, with an emergent new common sense, new products and new opportunity of profits – not of which have the ideal market of perfect competition.

For this, the lecture cites Prof. Carlota Perez’s work on the history of innovation, which shows that for every technological revolution, there is an installation period with bubbles and mania for initial investors, followed by turning point of collapse and recessions, which eventually leads to the general deployment of the technology for general prosperity with the intervention of the state.

Carlota Perez

While this may be the general trend of technological development and innovation deployment, the length of the frenzy, turning point and start of ensuing deployment period varies across societies and technologies. It is not inherent in the technology but a socio-political decision as to how and when the state responds to intervene such that the technology is used for general welfare. Similarly, the new common sense is also socially constructed.

Challenges:

The lecture also presents multiple interdependent challenges for economists, society and governments that digital technologies present:

Economics:

  • Why have firms when products and services can be crowdsourced or peer produced? Will their purpose only be rent extraction from this production? What would it mean for national accounting systems, if tasks that create economic value are so dis-aggregated?
  • What does this means for markets? Why do we need privately owned platforms when peer-production can be just as or more efficient?
  • If production of information is collective, why not have commons type ownership? What does it mean for the notion of property?

Society:                                                                                                                             

  • Welfare state vs personalized services – universality of government policies vs individual-focused customization
  • Statistical self vs automated self – following norms set by government vs going along with personalized feedback from devices
  • Countervailing institutions vs digital nomad – unionized labor vs gig workers

Governance:

  • Stability and predictability vs agility and experimentalism
  • From reaction to anticipation – predictive policing
  • Automation, platforms and inclusion – governments thinking like platforms e.g. payments systems, identity systems and automated services

Criticism:

While these comparisons and contrasts are important, the state and the firms seems to be understood here in the same fashion i.e. as centralizing institutions compared to the individual. Although they may have centralizing tendencies, there economic and political functions are fundamentally different – something we should never lose sight of. Even if the government provides some services or acts like platforms in a digital economy, its political identity has to be understood as separate from firms.

Similarly, the juxtaposition of universality and personalization may be less antagonistic and more about balance,as against what is presented in the lecture. While the automated self with personalized services becomes more prominent, it might not be wise for the state to lose sight of some universality and statistical averages in terms of policy making even as it focuses on the calibrating itself to individual citizens. Moreover, governance that has agility, is experimental, is automated or anticipates policy issues has to be always looked through the lens of inclusive democratic norms before institutionalizing these changes, which may not themselves yield inclusive or constitutionally sound results.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the lecture is an insightful analysis of the challenges and opportunities of the coming digital economy, what we need to think about, where to intervene and how to understand and shape the changes taking place around us.

Platform Economy: Some Thoughts and Concerns

As digital platforms become the norm of emerging business models, often defying sectoral fragmentation, they present new conceptual and practical challenges for people impacted by them. They also present concerns for government of regulation as well as for the public about privacy. As the stock markets increasingly pin all hope of a speedy recovery on these platforms, we need to think anew about these platforms.

The following is a limited list of concerns that may become relevant to our economic and social life in a few years:

  • What will platforms mean for wages and workers?
  • Just because a technology exists, to collect new and pervasive kinds of datasets, should it necessarily be deployed and made the norm?
  • Is the economic framework of competition sufficient to explain the economic trends that we seen on platforms?
  • What would competition mean when the marketplace is not some self-regulating space but a privately owned infrastructure which records every transaction to it’s own advantage?
  • In this ‘growth over profits’ model which relies heavily on predatory pricing, how do we think about anti-trust regulation – the very basis of which has been the preclusion of predatory pricing?
  • In considering mergers and acquisitions, is the economies of scale analysis sufficient in this context of strategic consolidations motivated by data accumulation?
  • What does it mean to own a device in this new environment of digital platforms? Is this ‘good as a service’?
  • How we define the ownership of intangible data when it is stored in distant servers?
  • What would reselling of digital content mean on these hyper-coordinated platforms? Can an Amazon book, once read, be sold? Can a CAT scan machine that stores data on a company-owned server be sold? What would that transfer of ownership look like?
  • Given a platform’s commercial imperatives, it has every incentive to comply with pervasive government requests for user data. The question then becomes under what framework are those requests to be assessed?
  • The code gives platforms a better deal. But does this deal make public sense?
  • Platforms encode only limited possibilities. In light of the fact that they are becoming essential economic infrastructures, who decides these possibilities?
  • Some desirable but unprofitable actions might be coded away while some other undesirable but profitable actions happen freely. Ultimately, this will depend on the architecture that the platform code designs. So, indirect regulation of human behavior – either due to government compliance or for commercial purposes is not unthinkable. Which behavior, in what instances, do we think should be regulated? Who decides?
  • While it is acknowledged that complete anonymity is impossible, how do we devise a framework to allow only judicial use of traceability and identification?
  • What would be the implications of trade treaties signed by government in the context of these platforms which store the most essential raw material, data, in distant places which can be used for diplomatic coercion?
  • How far will easy monetary policy, over-dependence on digital economy and cross-subsidization go in reviving growth?
  • Just because it has been difficult to regulate the platforms doesn’t mean that is how it should be. And how should it be – is an important question that should be openly debated. We need to be wary of the demands to keep these technologies out of political considerations because they will inevitably affect politics.

Some Readings:

  1. Platform Capitalism. Nick Srnicek. Polity Press. 2017.
  2. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace : Version 2.0. Lawrence Lessig. Basic Books, NY. 2006.