Regulation of networked industries: Questions from a monopoly perspective

With increase in the prevalence and pervasiveness of networked industries in our lives, there is an increasingly involved debate on regulation of big technological companies. Both from the economic left and the right, there are voices that raise alarm about the size and scope that the firms in these industries are attaining. While some have suggested breaking up of these companies into smaller ones, others have advocated for wise regulation.

Despite the muddled nature of this debate, this much is clear: The concern for market structure, which had given way to focus on prices as the object of regulation, is back. Tendencies of monopolization are no longer being assumed to be benign or natural as had been the case for the past few decades.

The network effects, the economies of scale and scope as well as the reduction of redundancies that monopolization can bring into a networked industry, does not discount the fact that it bestows an unparalleled power to the owners of the network. The question then becomes how do we think about this power and what to do about it.

In this context, here are a few questions that may be relevant:

  1. If monopoly isn’t illegal, how does one decide if it is “natural”?
  2. What are the supply side (cost) characteristics of the market that can be used to justify a natural monopoly? How is such a legal monopoly to be regulated?
  3. What are the demand side properties that justify the tendency of a firm to monopolize an industry?
  4. If monopolization is an acceptable tendency in an industry, how far can we allow the market power to grow? Is the regulation then to be focused on Price? Service quality? Distribution? Efficiency? Social welfare?
  5. What if regulation is more costly than monopolization?
  6. How do we respond to competitive pressures generated by technological change on monopolies?
  7. How do we evaluate the desirability to introduce competition in an already monopoly market?
  8. In terms of regulation, is there a possibility of better information exchange between regulator and the regulated so as to make decisions efficient?
  9. What are the assumptions that get built into the economy with introduction of competition or with changed regulation? How does that change?
  10. If there is only a partial introduction of competition into auxiliary business opportunities of incumbent monopolies, doesn’t that still leave the new entrants in these fields vulnerable to the willingness of the incumbent to share access?
  11. Even so, what are the terms and conditions of this access?

References:

Joskow, P., Regulation of natural monopolies, Handbook of Law and Economics (2007)

Platform Economy: Some Thoughts and Concerns

As digital platforms become the norm of emerging business models, often defying sectoral fragmentation, they present new conceptual and practical challenges for people impacted by them. They also present concerns for government of regulation as well as for the public about privacy. As the stock markets increasingly pin all hope of a speedy recovery on these platforms, we need to think anew about these platforms.

The following is a limited list of concerns that may become relevant to our economic and social life in a few years:

  • What will platforms mean for wages and workers?
  • Just because a technology exists, to collect new and pervasive kinds of datasets, should it necessarily be deployed and made the norm?
  • Is the economic framework of competition sufficient to explain the economic trends that we seen on platforms?
  • What would competition mean when the marketplace is not some self-regulating space but a privately owned infrastructure which records every transaction to it’s own advantage?
  • In this ‘growth over profits’ model which relies heavily on predatory pricing, how do we think about anti-trust regulation – the very basis of which has been the preclusion of predatory pricing?
  • In considering mergers and acquisitions, is the economies of scale analysis sufficient in this context of strategic consolidations motivated by data accumulation?
  • What does it mean to own a device in this new environment of digital platforms? Is this ‘good as a service’?
  • How we define the ownership of intangible data when it is stored in distant servers?
  • What would reselling of digital content mean on these hyper-coordinated platforms? Can an Amazon book, once read, be sold? Can a CAT scan machine that stores data on a company-owned server be sold? What would that transfer of ownership look like?
  • Given a platform’s commercial imperatives, it has every incentive to comply with pervasive government requests for user data. The question then becomes under what framework are those requests to be assessed?
  • The code gives platforms a better deal. But does this deal make public sense?
  • Platforms encode only limited possibilities. In light of the fact that they are becoming essential economic infrastructures, who decides these possibilities?
  • Some desirable but unprofitable actions might be coded away while some other undesirable but profitable actions happen freely. Ultimately, this will depend on the architecture that the platform code designs. So, indirect regulation of human behavior – either due to government compliance or for commercial purposes is not unthinkable. Which behavior, in what instances, do we think should be regulated? Who decides?
  • While it is acknowledged that complete anonymity is impossible, how do we devise a framework to allow only judicial use of traceability and identification?
  • What would be the implications of trade treaties signed by government in the context of these platforms which store the most essential raw material, data, in distant places which can be used for diplomatic coercion?
  • How far will easy monetary policy, over-dependence on digital economy and cross-subsidization go in reviving growth?
  • Just because it has been difficult to regulate the platforms doesn’t mean that is how it should be. And how should it be – is an important question that should be openly debated. We need to be wary of the demands to keep these technologies out of political considerations because they will inevitably affect politics.

Some Readings:

  1. Platform Capitalism. Nick Srnicek. Polity Press. 2017.
  2. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace : Version 2.0. Lawrence Lessig. Basic Books, NY. 2006.